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THE NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTOR IN
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
INTRODUCTION
The law creates two distinct duties of an employer to the public.
The first is the employer's duty to answer for the wrongs of his
employees committed within the scope of their employment.' The
second is his duty not to entrust a vehicle to one he knows to be
incompetent. The former duty is the well-known theory of re-
spondeat superior. The latter, lesser known theory of negli-
gent entrustment is a special application of the Restatement of
Torts:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a
chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows
or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth,
inexperience or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving
unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others
whom the supplier should expect to share in or be en-
dangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm
resulting therefrom.
2
In Willis v. Hill,3 a wrongful death action resulting from a
motor vehicle collision, the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that,
if a defendant is sued under both respondeat superior and negli-
1. See generally Person, Basis for Master's Liability and For Prin-
cipals Liability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. REv. 260 (1951); James,
Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REv. 161 (1954); Laski, The Basis of
Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 228 (1957) provides:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if,
but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and
space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve
the master; and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against an-
other, the use of force is not expectable by the master.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965). See also Perin
v. Peuler, 373 Mich. 531, 533, 130 N.W.2d 4, 8 (1964); Gulla v. Straus, 154
Ohio St. 193, 93 N.E.2d 662, 666 (1950) which states:
In a case such as the instant one, the burden is upon the plaintiff
to establish that the motor vehicle was driven with the permis-
sion and authority of the owner; that the entrustee was in fact an
incompetent driver; and that the owner knew at the time of the
entrustment that the entrustee was incompetent or unqualified to
operate the vehicle, or had knowledge of such facts and circum-
stances as would imply knowledge on the part of the owner of
such incompetency.
3. 116 Ga. App. 848, 159 S.E.2d 145 (1964) rev'd, 224 Ga. 263, 161
S.E.2d 281 (1968). The Court of Appeals decision was reversed on a pro-
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gent entrustment, his admission of scope of employment precludes
the plaintiff from asserting the theory of recovery based on negli-
gent entrustment. 4
This Note will analyze the soundness of that decision in light
of standard rules of evidence, common law negligence theories,
special effects of the comparative negligence system, and the possi-
bility of punitive damages.
SUMMARY OF WILLIS V. HILL
The plaintiff's husband was killed when his pick-up truck
collided with defendant Southern Poultry, Inc.'s 5 tractor-trailer
truck driven by Southern's employee Willis. The plaintiff pleaded
two theories of recovery against Southern-respondeat superior
and negligent entrustment. At the trial, over Southern's objection,
evidence of specific instances of negligence concerning Willis' prior
driving record was admitted. The trial resulted in a general ver-
dict and judgment for the plaintiff.6
An appeal was brought on defendant's objection to the presence
of the negligent entrustment issue, with its attendant consequence
of rendering as relevant the evidence of Willis' prior driving
record. At trial, Southern had made a motion for judgment on
the issue of negligent entrustment and that such issue should be
physically struck from the plaintiff's pleadings. In this same mo-
tion the defendant admitted that Willis was their employee and was
acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the
collision. The Court of Appeals reasoned that if the plaintiff could
recover at all, she could get all the damages to which she was en-
titled under respondeat superior; thus, after the defendant ad-
mitted scope of employment, the theory of negligent entrustment
became irrelevant and should have been struck.7 The trial court's
decision was reversed.
Hill, then, stands for three propositions: (1) the theories of
respondeat superior and negligent entrustment are distinct theo-
ries of recovery involving separate acts of negligence on the part
of two defendants; (2) the damages recoverable would be the
same under either theory; and (3) the admission of scope of em-
cedural point (duplicity of pleading) which in no way affected their
position on the issue being discussed in this note.
4. Willis v. Hill, 116, Ga. App. 848, 851, 159 S.E.2d 145, 150 (1967).
5. Hereinafter defendant Southern Poultry, Inc. is referred to as
Southern.
6. Id. at 851, 159 S.E.2d at 150.
7. Id. at 859, 159 S.E.2d at 157.
ployment makes the theory of recovery based on negligent entrust-
ment and its accompanying evidential matter irrelevant to the
proceedings.
PROOF OF INCOMPETENCY UNDER NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT
The evidence admissible under the negligent entrustment
theory differs from that which the plaintiff may introduce under
respondeat superior, even if it is alleged that the servant was in-
competent and inexperienced. In the latter situation, mere alle-
gation of incompetence of the servant does not permit the intro-
duction of evidence thereof as tending to prove the particular
negligence alleged." This introduction would amount to evidence
of the servant's character, obviously subject to the general rule that
in a civil action the character of a party is inadmissible.9
Under negligent entrustment, where the character of the en-
trusted driver is in issue, proof of incompetency may be evi-
denced by reputation and by specific instances of carelessness,
intoxication, or recklessness. 10 As noted above, the plaintiff must
have pleaded that the owner of the vehicle entrusted it with knowl-
edge of the driver's incompetency. Evidence is admissible of the
owner's actual knowledge or reason to know of the driver's pre-
vious accidents or specific instances of his incompetency, careless-
ness, intoxication, or recklessness, or of driver's reputation for
same."
8. Black v. Hunt, 96 Conn. 663, 115 A. 429 (1921); Nelson v. Seiler,
154 Md. 63, 139 A. 564 (1927); Flannagan v. Brown, 211 App. Div. 694,
208 N.Y.S. 211 (1925).
9. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 64 (1940). Two reasons are given for this
rule: (1) the party's character is usually of no probative value; (2) this
evidence introduces prejudice, collateral issues, and waste of time.
10. E.g., Breeding v. Massey, 378 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1967); Laney v.
Blackburn, 25 Ala. App. 248, 144 So. 126 (1932); Ray v. Mays, 242 Ark. 79,
411 S.W.2d 865 (1967); Waller v. Yarborough, 232 Ark. 258, 337 S.W.2d
641 (1960); Tansey v. Robinson, 24 Ill. App. 2d 227, 164 N.E.2d 272 (1960);
Elliott v. A.J. Smith Contracting Co., 358 Mich. 398, 100 N.W.2d 257
(1960); Guedon v. Rooney, 160 Ore. 621, 87 P.2d 209 (1939); Kennedy v.
Crumley, 51 Tenn. App. 359, 367 S.W.2d 797 (1962). C. McCORMICK, LAw
OF EVIDENCE § 154 (1954) says:
A persons possession of a particular character trait may be an
operative fact which under the substantive law determines the le-
gal rights and liabilities of the parties. When this is so, and when
such character trait has been put in issue by the pleadings, the
fact of character must of course be open to proof, and the courts
have usually held that it may be proved by evidence of specific
acts. While this is the method most likely to create prejudice and
hostility, it is also the most decisive revelation of character, which
is here the center of inquiry. We are willing to incur a hazard of
prejudice here, and even supervise, which we are not when char-
acter is sought to be shown by specific acts on other occasions,
only for a remoter and often doubtful inference as to the persons
acts which are the subject of the suit.
11. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
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INSTANCES WHERE BoTH RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND NEGLIGENT
ENTRusTmENT HAVE BEEN PLEADED
Respondeat superior and negligent entrustment are both
pleaded where the defendant either specifically denies scope of
employment or repudiates the employment relationship itself, and
the plaintiff feels that proof of either may be difficult. 2 If the
defendant, however, realizes that the existence of employment
and scope of employment are provable, he will probably concede
the agency issue. The plaintiff must still prove negligence; the
admission of agency usually has the effect of precluding the cause in
negligent entrustment and its attendant evidentiary matter, as it
did in Hill.8 The ultimate effect of defendant's admission of agency,
then, is that the plaintiff must prove the employee-driver's negli-
gence as the proximate cause of his injury; but he can introduce
neither the driver's reputation of incompetence, nor specific in-
stances of his incompetence.
a. Cases Precluding Negligent Entrustment When Agency Is
Admitted.
Part of the authority relied on by Hill consisted of four
opinions 14 from the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. These cases are
substantially similar. Plaintiffs sued in both respondeat superior
and negligent entrustment. After the defendants admitted scope
of employment, the courts struck the claim of negligent entrust-
ment. Evidence of the driver's previous acts of negligence were
refused as irrelevant under respondeat superior. The source for
these holdings was an earlier Texas case 5 which held that evi-
dence of similar acts of negligence or habitual acts of negligence
are not admissible to show that one has been negligent in doing
or failing to do a particular act.
Another case cited in Hill held that it is unnecessary to pursue
the theory of negligent entrustment after agency had been ad-
12. E.g., Breeding v. Massey, 378 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1967); Nehi
Bottling Co. v. Jefferson, 226 Miss. 586, 84 So. 2d 684 (1956); National
Trucking Convoy, Inc. v. Saul, 375 P.2d 922 (Okla. 1962); Crowell v.
Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 134 S.E. 576 (1926).
13. See discussion under subsection a. infra.
14. Rogers v. McFarland, 402 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966);
Frasier v. Pierce, 398 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Luvual v. Kenke
and Pillot, Division of Kroger Co., 366 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963);
Patterson v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 349 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961).
15. Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. Johnson, 92 Tex. 380, 48 S.W. 568
(1932).
mitted.16 It is only necessary to prove negligence on the part of
the driver. It was prejudicial error to allow cross-examination as
to previous driving offenses because of the possible inference the
jury might take, that is, if the driver had been negligent previously
he was negligent on the occasion in question. Similarly, another
court held that the effect of either respondeat superior or negli-
gent entrustment is to impose the same liability upon the em-
ployer or entrustor as might be assessed against the employee or
entrustee. 17 As such, since damages would be the same, the
plaintiff was not prejudiced by negligent entrustment being struck
after the defendant admited scope of employment.
The obvious gist of the above cases and others holding sim-
ilarly1 8 is that the courts are reluctant to take exception to the
"character evidence rule." Further, they wish to prevent the
needless expansion of trial time and introduction of collateral
issues which would be involved in evidence concerning negli-
gent entrustment. In short, after agency is admitted, negligent
entrustment is merely "excess baggage."
If the action taken by the above courts deprives the plaintiff
of his choice of theory or theories to sue, it is justified by the
courts equating the causes of action after agency is admitted,
so that the plaintiff has only one cause of action.19
Obviously, the reasoning of these cases has no validity where
the agency relationship or scope of employment is in doubt, and
the courts have held accordingly.
2
b. Cases Not Precluding Negligent Entrustment When Agency
Is Admitted.
Authority for the proposition that the admission of agency
does not preclude the theory of recovery based on negligent en-
trustment is provided by only one case. 2' Clark v. Stewart
22
16. Houlihan v. McCall, 197 Md. 130, 78 A.2d 661 (1951).
17. Armenta v. Churchill, 42 Cal. 2d 448, 267 P.2d 303 (1954).
18. E.g., Drosser v. Richman, 133 Conn. 253, 50 A.2d 85 (1946) stated
that negligent entrustment was limited to cases where agency was not in-
volved. Nesbit v. Cumberland Contracting Co., 196 Md. 36, 75 A.2d 339
(1950) stated that since appellants admitted scope of employment, evi-
dence relevant under negligent entrustment was no longer admissible.
Heath v. Kirkman, 240 N.C. 303, 82 S.E.2d 104 (1954) recognized the
negligent entrustment theory, but said that it was applicable only when
the plaintiff attempted to cast liability on an owner not otherwise re-
sponsible for the conduct of the driver of a vehicle. Houston v. Watson,
376 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) stated that a minor's prior mis-
conduct would be immaterial as concerns the father's cause of action in
view of his stipulation that any negligence on the minor's part would be
imputed to him.
19. See cases cited in note 17 supra.
20. See note 11 supra.
21. The following cases lend support, but are not authority on the
particular issue. Perkin v. Peuler, 373 Mich. 531, 130 N.W.2d 4 (1964)
involved pleading of liability based on Michigan's motor vehicle owner-
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was an action for personal injury alleged to have been caused by a
minor operating a motor vehicle as agent for his father. The
father admitted scope of employment and moved to strike the plea
of negligent entrustment. The court overruled the motion, noting
that the admission fell far short of admitting actual liability. The
court said that since the two theories are distinct, both could be
pleaded and proven, unless the defendant admits liability.
Specific instances of prior negligence on the part of the employee-
driver were admitted which evidence the court said would not be
admitted, had negligent entrustment been pleaded. Apparently,
the court saw the admission as a tactic to deprive the plaintiff of
his privilege to plead and prove alternative theories, 23 a tactic
which in this instance was to no avail.
EFFECT OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
a. Standard Negligence System
The defendant's liability under negligent entrustment is based
upon his negligence in entrusting his truck to an incompetent
driver. The causation link, however, must be provided by the
incompetency of the driver.24 Sometimes the causation link may
be established even though the driver himself is not negligent,25
however, a more frequent situation is where the driver's incom-
liability statute and on the common law negligent entrustment theory.
The defendant's admission of scope of consent under the statute had the
same effect as admission of scope of employment would under respondeat
superior. The court did not preclude the theory based on negligent en-
trustment nor its accompanying evidentiary matter. The majority opinion,
however, gave no cognizance to the fact that the admission had been
made. See also LaRose v. Shanghnessy Ice Co., 197 App. Div. 821, 189
N.Y.S. 562 (1921) where plaintiff asserted negligent entrustment where
agency relationship was obvious. Wishone v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Tenn.
App. 229, 97 S.W.2d 452 (1936) where although plaintiff brought suit in
both respondeat superior and negligent entrustment, the court found that
the driver, although incompetent, was not negligent so that respondent
superior could not be applied.
22. 126 Ohio 263, 185 N.E. 71 (1933).
23. Id. at 264, 185 N.E. at 73:
It will be noted that this admission falls far short of admitting
liability, but counsel seems to think that by this admission the
charge that the father was negligent in entrusting his car to his
son, who was an incompetent driver, was taken out of the case
entirely. This court cannot subscribe to that contention.
24. See note 3 supra.
25. See Wishone v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Tenn. App. 229, 97 S.W.2d
452 (1936) where the entrusted driver was an epileptic, whose incompe-
tence was the cause of plaintiff's injuries. The entrustor was held to be
negligent, although the driver was not.
petency amounts to negligence.26 In either situation, the contrib-
utory negligence of the plaintiff is available as a defense to the
defendant,27 in that it cuts off the necessary causation. Thus, to
establish liability, proximate causation against the entrustor must
be proven, one step of which is to prove actual causation by
the incompetent entrusted driver.28 The situation under respon-
deat superior is slightly different in that the only proof necessary,
.after agency is established, is that the negligence of the servant
must be shown to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Clearly, contributory negligence is also a defense to the respondeat
superior theory.
b. Comparative Negligence System
The dissent in Hill29 took the position that under the compara-
tive negligence system, 0 employed in Georgia,3 1 the combined
negligence of the entrustor and the entrusted driver should be
balanced against the alleged contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff. At first, this suggestion, although impractical,
82
seems equitable. After all, both the entrustor and his driver are
negligent. Should not their total degree of negligence be balanced
against the plaintiff's total degree of negligence? The answer be-
comes clear from an examination of a typical comparative negli-
gence statute.
26. See note 11 supra.
27. See PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 426-436 (3d ed. 1964). But
see Greenwood v. Gardner, 189 Kan. 68, 366 P.2d 780 (1961).
28. THE LAW OF TORTS 241 (3d ed. 1964), says: "Although it is not
without its complications, the simplest and most obvious problem con-
nected with "proximate cause" is that of causation in fact." More generally
see: Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956);
Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law (1962), 60 MIcH. L.
REV. 543 (1962).
29. Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga. App. 848, 869, 159 S.E.2d 145, 165 (1967).
30. There are only six jurisdictions in the United States with general
comparative negligence statutes. The theory was instituted to do away
with the harsh common law doctrine of contributory negligence, under
which the slightest negligence will bar plaintiff's recovery. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1 (1947); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1933); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1151 (1943); MIss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942); S.D. CODE § 47.0304
(1939); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1953).
31. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1933):
If the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the conse-
quences to himself caused by defendant's negligence, he is not en-
titled to recover. In other cases the defendant is not relieved,
although the plaintiff may in some way have contributed to the
injury sustained.
32. It is suggested that to compare "non-physical" negligence, such
as the act of entrustment combined with one part of the actual cause, the
driver's incompetence, against the other part of the actual cause, the
plaintiff's contributory negligence would be beyond the human facility.
However, multiple party suits, where all parties contribute to the actual
cause have been tried in comparative negligence jurisdictions. For an
example of the result, see Quady v. Sickl, 260 Wis. 348, 51 N.W.2d 3 (1952)
where parties were found 47.08%, 23.33%, 14.17% and 15.42% contributory.
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The fact that the person injured . . . may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery,
but damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
injured.
33
The text of the statute points out that the plaintiff's recovery is
to be diminished by his contribution. The defendant is viewed as
bearing 100% responsibility, and the plaintiff's contribution, for ex-
ample, 20%, is to be subtracted therefrom. 4 In this instance the
plaintiff would get 80% of his damages, the amount deemed to have
been caused by the defendant. It is submitted that to allow the jury
to total both the entrustor's and the driver's negligence as compared
to the plaintiff's, could only have the effect of starting the de-
fendants with more than 100% responsibility. Such a system would
tend to be more admonatory than compensatory. As such, the Hill
dissent turns out to be both impractical and inequitable.
EFFECT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The dissent in Hill, arguing against striking the negligent en-
trustment claim, stated that punitive damages were an issue under
this theory. 5 Under negligent entrustment it is not necessary that
the entrusted driver be guilty of gross negligence in order to show
that the entrustor is grossly negligent. If the entrustor allows one
whom he knows to be very incompetent to operate his vehicle,
then it would seem that there is a jury question as to whether
the entrustor has been guilty of such a high degree of negligence
as to render him liable for punitive damages. 6
Without a full explanation, the Hill dissent points out the left-
handed function of the tort system-admonishment.37 Certainly,
the primary purpose of tort liability is to compensate the plain-
tiff, but an important secondary purpose is to discourage the de-
33. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942).
34. E.g., Southern Ry. v. Neely, 284 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1960); Hatton
v. Wright, 115 Ga. App. 4, 153 S.E.2d 669 (1967).
35. Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga. App. 848, 870, 159 S.E.2d 145, 166 (1967).
36. Breeding v. Massey, 378 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1967); cf. Jackson v.
Co-op Cab Co., 102 Ga. App. 688, 117 S.E.2d 627 (1960); But see Thomas-
son v. Winsett, 310 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. App. 1958).
37. WEBSTER'S TimiD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Merrian-Web-
ster 1967) defines admonish:
[T]o indicate duties, obligations, or requisite action to (a person);
express warning or disapproval to about remissness or error esp.
gently, earnestly, and solicitously in urging duty, caution, or
amendment.
fendant from further negligent conduct."' When the defendant
acts with such a high disregard for the rights of others as to make
it likely that he will continue in this course, the courts exercise their
admonatory function by awarding punitive damages.
3 9
What effect should the possibility of punitive damages have
when the defendant admits agency after respondeat superior and
negligent entrustment have been pleaded by the plaintiff? Under
respondeat superior, the employer is not necessarily negligent,
and the reason that he is held liable is simply because he has the
"deeper pockets. ' 40 However, the whole gist of negligent en-
trustment is that the entrustor negligently put an incompetent
behind the wheel. If the entrustor shows an indifference to the
consequences of his action, punitive damages become an important
part of plaintiff's case. An example of this is a recent Arkansas
case4' where the plaintiff sued in both respondeat superior and
negligent entrustment. Punitive damages were claimed only on
the negligent entrustment claim and only against the entrustor.
The plaintiffs recovered $130,000 in compensatory damages and
$35,000 in punitive damages. At the opposite extreme, evidence of
the entrusted driver's thirty-seven prior traffic convictions, includ-
ing manslaughter, was excluded after the defendant admitted
agency.4 2 Clearly, this evidence would have pointed to punitive
damages against the entrustor. In such a situation, should the
savings in trial time outweigh the exercise of the admonatory
function of the courts?
CONCLUSION
From a practical point of view, the dismissal of a cause of ac-
tion in negligent entrustment, after admission of agency under
respondeat superior, seems logical. Dismissal lessens trial time
and precludes the collateral issues involved in proving a case in
negligent entrustment.
38. See generally Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV.
564 (1952).
39. E.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hill, 245 F. Supp. 796 (D.C. Mo.
1965) (punishment and deterrance); Miami Beach Lerner Shops, Inc. v.
Walco Mfg., 106 So. 2d 233 (Fla. App. 1958) (warning and example to deter
from comitting similar offenses); Smith v. Hill, 147 N.E.2d 321, 12 Ill. 2d
588 (1958) (in the interest of society); Harrod v. Fraley, 289 S.W.2d 203
(Ky. App. 1956),(discourage similar future conduct); Allison v. Simmons,
306 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) (as an example for good of public);
Gladfeller v. Doenel, 2 Wis. 2d 635, 87 N.W.2d 490 (1958) (deterrant and
punishment).
40. See George v. Bekins V. & S. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 834, 205 P.2d 1037
(1949), citing from Car v. Win. C. Cromwell Co., 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d
5 (1946); Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 A.
107 (1930); Goodyear T. & R. Co. v. Paddock, 219 Ind. 672, 40 N.E.2d 697
(1942); KohIman v. Hyland, 54 N.D. 710, 210 N.W. 643 (1926); Carroll v.
Beard-Laney, Inc., 207 S.C. 339, 35 S.E.2d 425 (1945).
41. Breeding v. Massey, 378 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1967).
42. Armenta v. Churchill, 42 Cal. 2d 448, 267 P.2d 303 (1954).
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It seems, however, that negligent entrustment promotes the
admonatory function of the tort system. Certainly, with more
vehicles on the road, the entrustment of even one of these vehicles
to an incompetent can have far reaching effects. Such conduct
should not only be discouraged, but prohibited to the fullest ex-
tent possible. In a case where both respondeat superior and negli-
gent entrustment are pleaded, the entrusted drivers often turn
out to be men who drive trucks regularly 3 as part of their work.
If these men are incompetent drivers, certainly there is a more de-
sirable place (from the public's point of view) for them to work.
This "message" is delivered through the courts, by way of punitive
damages.
Evidence of prior instances of negligence, admissible under
negligent entrustment, is highly prejudicial to the defendant on
the issue of respondeat superior and certainly should not be ad-
mitted if unnecessary. It is submitted that the cause of action in
negligent entrustment with its attendant evidentiary matter,
should neither be admitted nor dismissed as a matter of course
when agency is conceded under respondeat superior. To dismiss
it as a matter of course as was done in Hill gives the defendant an
easy tactic to avoid punitive damages. To admit it as a matter of
course gives the plaintiff a tactic to introduce highly prejudicial
evidence.
It is suggested that the judge, without the hearing of the jury,
consider the evidence under the claim of negligent entrustment
and decide as a matter of law if there is a question for the jury as to
punitive damages. Certainly, considerations on this issue should
be the previous instances where punitive damages have been
granted; but perhaps the foremost consideration should be the
particular situation of the defendant, the opportunity and prob-
ability of his repeated conduct, and the necessity for discourage-
ment of his conduct.
44
If this suggestion were adopted it is clear that the courts in
Hill and similar cases were too hasty in their decision and per-
haps deprived the plaintiff of a substantial part of his damages
and neglected the admonatory function of the tort system.
JAMES A. YOUNG
43. See note 11 supra.
44. J. C. Penny Co. v. O'Daniell, 263 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1959) stated:
"[Punitive damages] are awarded for the benefit of society."
